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Abstract—We introduce a scheme for distributing and storing
software with cryptographic functionality in the whitebox at-
tacker model. Our scheme satisfies two relevant properties:
incompressibility and traceability. The main idea is to store a
large amount of random data (a ‘blob’), some of which will be
randomly sampled in the future to serve as key material, and
some of which serves as a watermark. We study two variants:
with and without re-use of key material. For both variants we
analyse how many decryptions can be performed with the blob,
taking into account collusion attacks against the watermark. Our
results show that application of blob schemes in the context of
pay-TV is feasible.
Index Terms—Big key cryptography, data exfiltration, water-
marking.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Traceable big keys
The use of extremely large cryptographic keys (“Big-Key
Cryptography”, BKC) [14], [13], [10], [3] has been studied
as a countermeasure against key exfiltration from infected
devices. If the adversary’s bandwidth is limited, an assumption
known as the Bounded Retrieval Model, BKC ensures that
the exfiltrated material will be smaller than a whole key
and hence insufficient to perform cryptographic operations.
Another security measure that consumes large amounts of
memory is White-Box Cryptography (WBC or ‘whitebox’)
[1], [11], [12], the art of obfuscating a symmetric encryp-
tion/decryption executable such that the key is difficult to
extract. The difference between these two techniques is that a
WBC executable contains a short key (e.g. a single AES key)
in a blown-up form, whereas in BKC the key itself is very
large.
In this paper we consider BKC in combination with traceabil-
ity. A group of users receive software that contains exactly
the same decryption functionality but which is differently
watermarked for each user. If a user leaks his software, the
origin of the leak can be traced. As example use cases for this
kind of group functionality with software traceability one can
think of (a) protection of pay-TV keys, many of which are
shared by multiple customers; and (b) anonymous credentials,
where only group membership is verified without revealing a
person’s identity.
These scenarios of course do not require Big-Key Cryptogra-
phy. In pay-TV WBC has been deployed [11], which is also
well suited to watermark-based tracing. Anonymous creden-
tials systems have been constructed using group signatures
[4], [6], [8]; tracing of leaked credentials is easy since the
users’ keys are different. BKC however, when used properly,
has interesting advantages over these solutions. For instance, in
typical group signatures the crypto and the tracing are not post-
quantum secure. In contrast, we will present a BKC tracing
scheme that is information-theoretically secure, and it is easy
to make the decryption post-quantum secure. Furthermore, in
WBC one of the principal properties looked after is incom-
pressibility: it should be infeasible to compress the obfuscated
block cipher executable. Most whitebox techniques are either
completely broken or are known to be vulnerable to attacks
inspired by side channel analysis [2], [5]. On top of that,
whitebox traceability is no stronger than its incompressibility.
In contrast, the incompressibility of BKC is information-
theoretic.
In this paper we present and analyse a BKC scheme with
traceability based on a binary Tardos code. We focus on a
pay-TV use case.
B. Related work
Big-Key Cryptography.
Over the last two decades various schemes have been devel-
oped to protect against exfiltration of data in general [14] and
keys in particular [13], [10], [3]. The Bounded Retrieval Model
(BRM) assumes that the total amount of data that the attacker
can exfiltrate is limited. Under the BRM assumption security is
provided by working with keys and data structures whose size
exceeds this limit. To avoid paying a speed penalty on top of
the memory cost, cryptographic operations are then based on
(pseudo)randomly chosen subkeys instead of the whole key.
Using extractors it is then possible to derive keys that are
uniform even to an attacker who has observed parts of the
big key [3]. We will not go to this level of sophistication but
simply count how many key bits are known to the adversary.
An important difference between our paper and [3] is that we
don’t work in the BRM. In our case the adversary’s strategy
is dictated not by the wish to extricate exactly the right data
but by the necessity to stay untraceable.
Broadcast encryption.
The aim of broadcast encryption is to send different data to
different recipients over a broadcast channel. One example
is customers of a pay-TV operator who have different sub-
scriptions, i.e. get access to a different subset of TV channels.
A possible solution is to encrypt the transmissions according
to a so-called revocation tree [15], [19]. The customers are
the leaves of the tree. Each node of the tree has a node
key associated with it. Each customer has a decoder device
which comprises a number of node keys, for instance those
lying on the path from the leaf to the root. By appropriately
encrypting a message with a specific subset of the node keys
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2and broadcasting the ciphertexts, the operator can specify
in a fine-grained way which leaves are able to recover the
plaintext. In this way the operator can handle not only multiple
subscription types but also revocation of customers who have
misbehaved. Revocation trees are well suited for ‘static’ use
cases, i.e. situations where the device keys cannot easily be
replaced. In more dynamic environments broadcast encryption
can be achieved without revocation trees.
In the pay-TV setting different forms of unauthorized redis-
tribution (‘piracy’) exist. One method is for the attackers to
publish node keys from decoder devices. As long as these keys
are from nodes close to the root, they are present in many
decoders and hence they do not help the operator to pinpoint
who the pirates are. After this kind of key compromise,
the operator can recover by using node keys closer to the
leaves; the compromised keys may even be refreshed in such
a way that only authorized users receive the replacement keys.
Depending on the position of the leaked keys in the tree, the
recovery may take a lot of bandwidth.
A second form of piracy is the re-broadcasting of decrypted
content. Here the countermeasure is content watermarking.
The operator puts different watermarks into the content
streams, which then get encrypted with different node keys;
in this way it becomes visible from the pirate stream which
decryption key was employed by the attackers. For the operator
this kind of tracing is expensive in terms of bandwidth, since
multiple instances of the same content have to be broadcasted
simultaneously. The practical solution is to send a single
stream most of the time, and only occasionally duplicate a
small piece of the stream; a ‘0’ watermark is sent to one
subset of the customers and a ‘1’ watermark to the rest.
By varying the composition of the customer subset for each
duplicated piece, the operator can zoom in on individual leaf
keys. When only one compromised decoder box is used in
the re-broadcasting attack, the watermarking technique allows
the operator to identify the pirate relatively quickly. When the
keys from c boxes are combined (a collusion), the required
number of steps scales as c2 [21]. Special codes have been
developed that resist collusion attacks, in particular a class of
bias-based codes commonly known as Tardos codes [21]. For
an overview we refer to [22]. Tardos codes have been proposed
to watermark large data structures in the context of combined
client-side watermarking and decryption (‘fingercasting’) [16].
In this paper we will focus on a broadcast encryption scenario
that requires a revocation tree, and we propose to use a Tardos
code to watermark a BKC implementation of the top-level
node keys.
White-Box Cryptography.
The term ‘white-box attacks’ refers to attacks where the
adversary observes all details of a program’s execution. The
aim of WBC is to create executables with cryptographic
functionality in such a way that several security properties
are satisfied even in the white-box attacker model. Obfuscation
techniques typically result in very large executables, which are
called White-Box Implementations (WBIs) [11], [12]. One of
the desirable security properties is incompressibility: even if
it is not possible to prevent the attacker from running a copy
of the executable on another device, it should at least not be
too easy for the adversary to create a version of the attacked
WBI that is significantly smaller than the WBI.1
A second desirable property is traceability [18]. Consider a
key that multiple parties possess, e.g. a node key as described
above. If the individual WBIs of the node key are differently
watermarked, then a leaked node key can be traced. How-
ever, if the WBI is compressible then the watermark can be
destroyed with high probability.
WBIs are often made under the constraint that the cryp-
tographic functionality of the WBI must equal that of a
standardised block cipher, e.g. DES or AES. Such a constraint
usually comes from regulations or compatibility requirements.
Published white-boxing techniques that obfuscate a block
cipher do not provide provable incompressibility.
Anonymous credentials.
In a group signature scheme, the enrolled parties receive
credentials (signing keys) which differ from each other but
which allow each party to sign data in such a way that
the signature does not reveal which member of the group
created the signature. Schemes with short signatures have been
obtained [6], [8] using bilinear maps. Typically there is a
mechanism by which the anonymity can be revoked, either
by the group ‘manager’ or collectively by the members [9]
via some threshold mechanism. This revocation occurs when
a group member has misbehaved in some way, and is based on
the signature(s) without access to the credential itself. For the
purpose of the current paper the privacy revocation mechanism
is not relevant; instead we care about the credential itself being
(i) exfiltrated by an attacker or (ii) widely shared by the group
member. Furthermore, in the context of group signatures there
is the concept of collusion resistance, meaning that a collusion
of group members should not be able to create a signature that
implicates another member. This is a different concept from
the collusion-resistant watermarking that we will use.
Finally, we use the term ‘anonymous credential’ for anything
that allows a user to prove group membership, regardless of
the technique; in our BKC scheme the user demonstrates his
ability to decrypt a (symmetric-crypto) ciphertext.
Comparison to related work.
Summarised very briefly, this paper differs from related work
as follows.
Compared to ... our scheme has ...
Big Key Crypto tracing
whitebox provable incompressibility and tracing;
no speed penalty on decryption
revocation trees tracing of high-level node keys;
defense against exfiltration
group signatures post-quantum security of the crypto;
unconditionally secure tracing;
defense against exfiltration
C. Contributions and outline
We propose a very simple BKC scheme that has incompress-
ibility and traceability in the white-box attacker model. We
1 An extreme case is e.g. a WBI that implements AES-encryption /
decryption; if the attacker learns the key, the WBI can be compressed to
128 bits.
3construct a decryption algorithm based on a large lookup
table (a blob) whose entries are randomly probed to provide
key material. Interspersed with the functional entries there
are entries that contain tracing data. The blobs belonging to
different users contain exactly the same functional entries but
different tracing entries.
The blob is incompressible because all of its functional entries
may be used in the future, and the attacker cannot predict the
access sequence. The blob is traceable because the attacker
cannot sufficiently distinguish between functional entries and
tracing entries. Furthermore, a Tardos code is applied to ensure
collusion resistance.
We have two versions of our scheme: (i) single use of blob
entries, i.e. an entry gets discarded after it has been used; (ii)
multiple use. Both versions are easy to analyse with basic
combinatorics. An important design parameter is the width (in
bits) of each blob entry; this influences the number of entries
that need to be addressed in order to build one decryption key.
As a figure of merit we use the number of times ‘nmax’ that a
blob can probed before the colluders have enough information
to create an untraceable pirated blob.
• In Section III we give a step-by-step description of the
single-use variant, and we analyse its properties. It turns out
that it is optimal to split each key into individual bits, which
are picked from different locations in the blob. Furthermore,
we find that the figure of merit nmax depends on the number
of colluders only weakly.
• In Section IV we introduce and analyse the multiple-use
scheme variant . Here the optimal width of blob entries
equals the key size, i.e. keys are not split up. We find
that the nmax quickly degrades with increasing number of
colluders.
• We observe a cross-over as a function of the coalition size:
When the number of colluders is small, the multiple-use
scheme performs best, whereas the single-use scheme is
best in the case of large coalitions. This is illustrated in
Fig.1 below.
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Figure 1: Artist impression of the crossover between the two types of blob scheme. (See Fig.7 for
actual numbers.) The graph plots the maximum number of blob uses as a function of the number of
colluders. Shown is the single-use scheme with blob entries that are single bits, and the multi-use
scheme with blob entries that are full keys (128 bits).
In the context of content distribution, our scheme may be applied to watermark a number of high-
level node keys in the revocation tree. This has the advantage that node key publishing attacks,
which are especially powerful for those high-level nodes, get thwarted. In Section 5 we show that
the typical parameters in pay-TV (e.g. number of users, key refresh rate) are consistent with the
use of a blob scheme.
Compared to Whitebox watermarking, the advantage of a blob scheme is information-theoretic
security of the tracing. Furthermore a blob scheme has provable (information-theoretic) incom-
pressibility.
In the context of anonymous credentials, a blob scheme can be used to mimic the e↵ect of group
signatures. The ability to perform a symmetric decryption replaces the ability to create an asym-
metric group signature. The advantages of a blob are (i) post-quantum security of the crypto; (ii)
unconditional security of the tracing. A disadvantage is of course the size of the software.
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In the context of content distribution, our scheme may be
applied to watermark a number of high-level node keys in
the revocation tree. This has the advantage that node key
publishing attacks, which are especially powerful for those
high-level nodes, get thwarted. In Section V we show that
the typical parameters in pay-TV (e.g. number of users, key
refresh rate) are consistent with the use of a blob scheme.
Compared to Whitebox watermarking, the advantage of a blob
scheme is information-theoretic security of the tracing. Fur-
thermore a blob scheme has provable (information-theoretic)
incompressibility.
In the context of anonymous credentials, a blob scheme can
be used to mimic the effect of group signatures. The ability to
perform a symmetric decryption replaces the ability to create
an asymmetric group signature. The advantages of a blob
are (i) post-quantum security of the crypto; (ii) unconditional
security of the tracing. A disadvantage is of course the size of
the software.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation and terminology
We use the notation [N ] for {1, . . . , N}. We write sets in
calligraphic font. For a vector v and a set A, the vector vA
is defined as (vj)j∈A. For vectors v and w, the vector vw is
defined as (vw1 , vw2 , . . .). An erasure symbol (empty output) is
written as ⊥. The falling factorial is denoted as (x)k = x!(x−k)! .
Stirling numbers of the second kind are denoted as
{
n
k
}
, with
the property xn =
∑n
k=0
{
n
k
}
(x)k. The number
{
n
k
}
counts
how many ways there are to partition the integer n into k
(unlabeled) nonzero parts.
We will consider a broadcasting context with an Operator who
manages all the keys and prepares all encryptions, and which
is also the party that performs the tracing. The number of
users is U . The users are labeled 1, . . . , U . The coalition (set
of colluders) is C ⊂ [U ], with |C| = c.
In broadcast encryption the content is encrypted with a content
key that is occasionally refreshed. The broadcast contains spe-
cial parts called control messages that allow each authorized
user to obtain the content key.
We define the function BinoTail as the probability mass in
the right tail of a binomial distribution, BinoTail(`, a, p) def=∑`
j=a
(
`
j
)
pj(1 − p)`−j . The inverse function with respect to
the third argument is denoted as InvBinoTail.
B. Tardos codes
The study of collusion-resistant codes has resulted in a good
understanding of fingerprinting capacities and in efficient
codes that approach capacity. For the purposes of this paper
it suffices to quote one result from the literature, namely the
sufficient code length for tracing at least one member of the
attacking coalition.
The watermark is abstractly modelled as a a string of wa-
termark symbols from some alphabet, embedded in various
‘positions’ in the content. An undetectable position is defined
as a position where all colluders receive the same symbol.
Collusion attacks are often modelled using the Marking As-
sumption (MA) [7]: in undetectable positions the colluders are
allowed to output only the symbol that they have observed. Let
PFP be the overall probability that a false accusation occurs
4in the tracing procedure. When binary codes are used, the
sufficient code length as a function of c, U, PFP is given by
LbinaryMA,suff(c, U, PFP) ≈
pi2
2
c2 ln
U
PFP
. (1)
In this paper we restrict ourselves to binary codes because a
larger alphabet would open up powerful attack avenues and/or
make the blob scheme less efficient.2
If the Marking Assumption is relaxed a bit, by allowing
erasures ⊥ in a fraction ε of all undetectable positions, then
the code length (1) increases by a factor (1− ε)−2 [23].
III. BLOB SCHEME WITHOUT RE-USE OF ENTRIES
A. Scheme description
The general idea of our scheme is that the decryption-enabling
data structure consists of a large (pseudo)random data ‘blob’,
with tracing information inserted at positions that are known
only to the Operator. Let N be the number of data entries in
the blob B. We write B = (Bi)Ni=1, with Bi ∈ {0, 1}w. The
size of the blob (in bits) is denoted as M ,
M = Nw. (2)
A k-bit decryption key is obtained by collecting data from `
positions in the blob,
k = `w. (3)
In one extreme case w = 1 and ` = k, i.e. an entry is a single
bit. In another extreme case w = k and ` = 1, i.e. each blob
entry is an entire key. The set of tracing positions is T ⊂ [N ],
with |T | = t. In the positions T the Operator implements
a binary Tardos code; for j ∈ T only two different values
B
(0)
j , B
(1)
j ∈ {0, 1}w can be handed out to the users.
Below we outline the essence of the scheme. The approach
works for any symmetric3 decryption algorithm, and therefore
we do not specify the cipher.
Initialisation
The Operator (pseudo)randomly generates T and B[N ]\T . This
data is the same for all users. For each user u individually he
inserts tracing information z(u) in (Bj)j∈T . The personalised
blob B(u) is given to user u. The operator remembers z(u) for
all u ∈ [U ], and T and B[N ]\T . The Operator initializes a set
V to the empty set, V = ∅. The purpose of this set is to keep
track which blob entries have been used up.
Encryption
The Operator (pseudo)randomly generates a vector L =
(L1, . . . , L`) ∈ ([N ] \ (T ∪ V))`. It must hold that Li 6= Lj
for i 6= j. He encrypts the content using BL as key material.
He broadcasts the ciphertext and a compact description of L
to all users. He updates V 7→ V ∪ {L1, · · · , L`}.
Decryption
All users receive the ciphertext and the description of L. User
u decrypts the ciphertext using key material B(u)L .
2 In detectable positions, the colluders have the option of creating random
data, which (depending on the width of blob entries) may likely collide
with existing watermark symbols. Such collisions are detrimental to tracing.
Furthermore, for non-binary watermarking alphabet it becomes impossible to
reduce the blob entry width to one bit.
3 Or asymmetric. But then the advantage of post-quantum security may be
lost.
The encyption and decryption phase are repeated many times
before a new initialisation is required. Note that the users do
not have to store V; only the operator does. The incompress-
ibility is a consequence of the following facts,
• It takes many iterations before a user can guess T with any
accuracy.
• If user u publishes an edited blob B˜(u) that contains a
substantial part of B(u)T , he is traceable. On the other hand,
if he damages the non-tracing part of the blob, the published
B˜(u) will lose some of its decryption-enabling functionality.
Control messages
Broadcasting a description of L is potentially expensive in
terms of bandwidth. In the worst case, the Operator draws
` truly random pointers L1, · · · , L` under the constraint
Li /∈ T ∪ V; then he has to broadcast L logN bits. In
the most optimistic case, the Operator generates L1, · · · , L`
pseudorandomly from a single seed; then only the seed has
to be broadcast. Note that in this approach the constraint
∀i∈[`] Li /∈ T ∪ V is not automatically satisfied. Multiple
seed values have to be tried before the constraint is satisfied.
Depending on ` the trial-and-error procedure may be too
cumbersome for the Operator, and it may be preferable to
derive L from more than one seed.
M Size of the blob, in bits.
w Word size of the blob entries, in bits.
N Number of blob entries. M = Nw.
B The Blob. B = (Bi)Ni=1, Bi ∈ {0, 1}w.
t Number of blob entries used for tracing.
T The set of indices where B contains tracing information.
k Key size in bits.
` Number of blob entries needed to build a key. k = `w.
V Set of used blob indices.
n Number of times the blob has been used.
ε Fraction of data thrown away by the attackers.
ε∗ Threshold value for ε.
U Number of users.
C Coalition of users. C ⊂ [U ].
c Size of the coalition.
c0 Size of the coalition anticipated by the Operator.
PFP False Positive probability (false accusation).
Lsuff Sufficient code length for a binary Tardos code.
k0 Key size considered ‘sufficiently difficult’ to brute-force.
γ Tolerated prob. that pirated blob fails to provide next key.
B. Attack description
The coalition is a set C ⊂ [U ] of users, with |C| = c. The
output of the attack is denoted as y ∈ ({0, 1}w ∪ ⊥)N . The
colluders compare their versions of the blob, (B(u))u∈C . In
some positions D ⊂ [N ] they notice a difference. These
positions are called ‘detected’ positions. The set of detected
symbols in position i is denoted as Si ⊆ {0, 1}w. In any
position the colluders are allowed to output any value in
{0, 1}w or an erasure.4 For i ∈ T , outputting yi /∈ Si carries
some risk since it can happen that yi is not in the (position-
dependent) binary alphabet; such a ‘symbol error’ informs the
Operator that the colluders have different data in position i,
which helps him a lot. The probability of causing a Symbol
4 This is very different from audio-video watermarking, where the attack
must not cause perceivable glitches.
5Error is 2
w−2
2w−|Si| . Because of this risk to the colluders we will
not consider random outputs.
We consider an attack that consists of two steps,
1) An ‘ordinary’ collusion attack on the unused part of the
blob, [N ] \ V , under the Marking Assumption, resulting
in a new blob B˜ which may differ from the original ones
only in the detected positions D.
2) The colluders select a random subset E ∈ ([N ] \ V) \ D
of size |E| = ε(N − |V| − |D|). The output of the attack
equals B˜ with the replacement B˜j = ⊥ for all j ∈ E .
The purpose of the second step is to reduce the traceability of
the colluders in case the first step is not enough. (Note that we
assume the system parameters t, Lsuff to be publicly known
in accordance with the Kerckhoffs principle. The colluders
know exactly when they have achieved untraceability.) An
unintended side effect, from the point of view of the attackers,
is that they are destroying key material contained in BE .
C. Analysis of the attack
Let n be the number of keys that have been used up. Then
|V| = n`. We introduce the notation k0 for the lowest key
length that is considered ‘difficult’ to brute-force. Furthermore
we introduce a parameter γ which represents a target proba-
bility for the attack to fail. We consider k0, γ to be public, in
accordance with the Kerckhoffs principle.
As the figure of merit for a scheme at fixed M,k, k0, `, γ, Lsuff
we will use nmax. The nmax represents the number of blob
uses before it becomes possible for the attackers to publish an
untraceable pirate blob which allows for ‘easy’ brute-forcing
of future keys (fewer than k0 bits) with probability ≥ 1− γ.
1) Traceability: The deletions in E have the effect of erasing
a fraction ≈ ε of the undetectable positions in T . This can
be seen as a modification of the attacker model to incorporate
noise. As mentioned in Section II-B, for this modified attacker
model the required code length is increased by a factor (1−
ε)−2. If (1− ε)−2 > t/Lsuff then the Operator no longer has
control over the False Accusations; effectively the colluders
are untraceable. The breakeven point lies at
ε∗ = 1−
√
Lsuff
t
. (4)
If the traitor tracing scheme is chosen badly, then Lsuff is
large; then there is not much room in the blob for t to be
much larger than Lsuff , resulting in a small value of ε∗.
2) Probability that the pirated blob fails to provide the next
key: Brute-forcing fails if at least dk0/we blob entries out of
` are not available to the attackers. When a fraction ε∗ of the
functional entries is missing, the probability of this event is
computed as a partial binomial sum as follows,
Pr[#unavailable bits ≥ k0] =
∑`
a=dk0/we
(
`
a
)
εa∗(1− ε∗)`−a
= BinoTail(`, dk0w e, ε∗). (5)
A special case occurs for w ≥ k0: the attackers need all `
chunks and (5) reduces to Pr[#unavailable bits ≥ k0] = 1 −
(1− ε∗)`.
pirate blob which allows for ‘easy’ brute-forcing of future keys (fewer than k0 bits) with probability
  1   .
3.3.1 Traceability
The deletions in E have the e↵ect of erasing a fraction ⇡ " of the undetectable positions in T .
This can be seen as a modification of the attacker model to incorporate noise. As mentioned
in Section 2.2, for this modified attacker model the required code length is increased by a factor
(1 ") 2. If (1 ") 2 > t/Lsu↵ then the Operator no longer has control over the False Accusations;
e↵ectively the colluders are untraceable. The breakeven point lies at
"⇤ = 1 
r
Lsu↵
t
. (4)
If the traitor tracing scheme is chosen badly, then Lsu↵ is large; then there is not much room in
the blob for t to be much larger than Lsu↵ , resulting in a small value of "⇤.
2 4 6 8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
t/Lsu↵
"⇤
Figure 2: Threshold value "⇤ of the thrown-away fraction " as a function of the number of tracing
positions. In order for the pirates to remain undetected they have to set " > "⇤.
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`
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the borderline case is setting t such that
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The t enters via "⇤ = 1 
p
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t = Lsu↵
h
1  InvBinoTail(`, dk0k `e,  )
i 2
(7)
Note that (6) does not depend on M and n.
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Fig. 2. Threshold value ε∗ of the thrown-away fraction ε as a function of
the number of tracing positions. In order for the pirates to remain undetected
they have to set ε > ε∗.
The Operator is happy if the probability (5) exceeds the design
p rameter γ. At giv k, k0, `, γ the borderline case is setting
t such that
BinoTail(`, dk0k `e, ε∗) = γ. (6)
The t enters via ε∗ = 1−
√
Lsuff/t.
t = Lsuff
[
1− InvBinoTail(`, dk0k `e, γ)
]−2
(7)
Note that (6) does not dep nd on M and n.
3) Figure of merit: The figure of merit nmax is easy to
obtain as a function of M,k, k0, `, γ, Lsuff , since the attackers’
success probability does not actually depend on n. The nmax
simply equals the total number of keys stored in the blob.
However, this number depends on k, k0, `, γ, Lsuff nontrivially
via the parameter t. On the one hand, the amount of key
material contained in the blob (in bits) is M − tw. On the
other hand, each blob use consumes k bits. The number of
uses required to use up all key material is given by
nsinglemax (M,k, k0, `, γ, Lsuff) =
M − tw
k
=
M
k
− t
`
=
M
k
− 1
`
Lsuff
[
1− InvBinoTail(`, dk0k `e, γ)
]−2
. (8)
4) Choosing the parameters: The parameters M,k, k0, γ,
Lsuff are usually given. That leaves ` to be optimised. We
observe (see Fig. 3) that it is advantageous to choose ` as
large as possibe, i.e. ` = k. This can be understood intuitively:
Setting w = 1 reduces the space occupied by a tracing entry to
a single bit, which is especially important when the coalition
is large. Eq. (8) is slightly simplified to
nsinglemax (M,k, k0, ` = k, γ, Lsuff)
=
M
k
− Lsuff
k
[
1− InvBinoTail(`, k0, γ)
]−2
. (9)
Fig. 4 shows an example of nmax (9) as a function of the
coalition size c. We see that the reduction of nmax due to the
increasing Lsuff is rather mild.
IV. A SCHEME WITH RE-USE OF BLOB ENTRIES
A. Scheme description
Initialisation
The Operator (pseudo)randomly generates B[N ]\T . This data
is the same for all users. For each user u individually he inserts
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tracing information z(u) in B at locations T . Each user u
receives a personalised blob B(u).
Encryption
The Operator (pseudo)randomly generates a vector L =
(L1, . . . , L`) ∈ ([N ] \ T )`. (Note that for i 6= j, collisions
Li = Lj are allowed.) He encrypts the content using BL
as key material. He broadcasts the ciphertext and a compact
description of L to all users.
Decryption
User u receives the ciphertext and the description of L. He
decrypts the ciphertext using key material B(u)L .
B. Statistics of the number of visited positions
Let n be the number of times that a key is derived from the
blob. Then r = n` is the number of times that a random
index is drawn. Let V ∈ ([N ] \ T )r be the vector of drawn
indices, V = (V1, . . . , Vr). Note that an index can occur in
V multiple times. The attacker observes V . We denote set of
indices contained in V as V , with |V| ≤ r.
Lemma 1: Let s ≤ r. The probability distribution for the size
V is given by
Pr[|V| = s] = (N − t)s
(N − t)r
{r
s
}
=
1
(N − t)r
(
N − t
s
)
s!
{r
s
}
.
(10)
Proof: The number of ways to choose s out of N−t positions,
with ordering, is
(
N−t
s
)
s!; the factor
{
r
s
}
is the number of
partitions of r into s bins, such that no bin is left empty. One
has to divide by the total number of ways to draw a vector of
r elements from [N ] \ T , namely (N − t)r. 
Lemma 2: The expected number of visited positions after r
steps is
Ev|V| = (N − t)
[
1− (1− 1
N − t )
r
]
. (11)
Proof: From Lemma 1 we have Ev|V| =
∑r
s=0
(N−t)s
(N−t)r
{
r
s
}
s.
We write
{
r
s
}
s =
{
r+1
s
} − { rs−1}. This yields two
summations. Both sums are evaluated using the sum rule∑n
k=0
{
n
k
}
(x)k = x
n.
An alternative proof follows from counting non-visited posi-
tions. Each position in [N ] \ T has probability (1− 1N−t )r of
not being visited. 
C. Analysis of the attack
The attack is the same as in Section III-B. (Note that the
attacker is now the only party that keeps track of V .)
The relation between t and ε∗ is the same as in Section III-C1.
The main difference w.r.t. the single-use scheme is that the
failure probability of the attackers now depends on n.
1) Probability that the pirated blob fails to provide the next
key: The attackers randomly remove a fraction ε∗ from [N ]\V .
At fixed V , the probability that a random blob index in [N ]\T
is not available in the pirated blob is given by
Pmiss
def
= Pr[entry unavailable|V] = ε∗N − t− |V|
N − t . (12)
Obviously, with increasing |V| it becomes more likely that a
random entry is available, since V is fully kept in the pirated
blob. From (12) we get a binomial tail expression for the
probability that the number of unavailable entries is at least
k0/w, ensuring that brute forcing of the key is difficult,
Pfail
def
= Pr[#unavail.entries ≥ k0
w
]
= E|V|
∑`
a=dk0/we
(
`
a
)
P amiss(1− Pmiss)`−a
= E|V|BinoTail(`, dk0/we, Pmiss). (13)
Lemma 3: Let ε∗ ≤ 1` dk0w e. Then
Pfail ≥ BinoTail(`, dk0/we, ε∗(1− 1
N − t )
n`). (14)
Proof: The expression BinoTail(`, dk0/we, P ) viewed
as a function of P has a sigmoid shape, convex on
P ≤ 1` dk0/we ≈ k0/k and concave for larger P .
Via (12) the condition ε∗ ≤ 1` dk0w e ensures that
Pmiss lies in the convex part. We then use Jensen’s
inequality to write E|V|BinoTail(`, dk0/we, Pmiss) ≥
BinoTail(`, dk0/we,E|V|Pmiss) and finally invoke Lemma 2.

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4.3.3 Setting the parameters
Again we consider the parameters M,k, k0,  , Lsu↵ to be fixed. The task is to maximise n
multi
max
as a function of the still free parameters ` and t. We observe (see Fig. 5) that the best results
are obtained with ` = 1. Note that large values of ` can cause (18) to produce negative5 nmax,
especially when the coalition is large. The intuitive explanation is that at large ` the colluders
quickly learn many functional indices; in contrast to the single-use case, this knowledge is helpful
for them since it allows them to build a pirated blob with many functional entries.
In the special case ` = 1 the expression BinoTail(`, d`k0/ke, Pmiss) reduces to Pmiss, and the result
for nmax simplifies to
nmultimax (M,k, k0, ` = 1,  , Lsu↵ , t) =
ln(1 pLsu↵/t) + ln 1 
  ln(1  1M/k t )
(21)
=
hM
k
  t O(1)
i
ln
1 pLsu↵/t
 
. (22)
Note that we have the constraint t > Lsu↵/(1   )2.
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Fig. 5. nmultimax (16) as a function of `, at M = 2
24, k = 128, k0 = 96,
γ = 0.1. Top curve: Lsuff = 5000, t = 40000. Bottom curve: Lsuff =
20000, t = 50000.
2) Figure of merit nmax: We will us the right and side of
(14) as an a p oximation for Pfail. For ε∗ ≤ 1` dk0w we are then
erring on the side of caution (Lemma 3). However, als for
larger ε∗ the approximation is not bad, since the distribution
of |V| becomes narrow asymptotically. The defining relation
for the figure of merit nmax becomes
γ = BinoTail(`, d`k0
k
e, ε∗[1− 1N−t ]nmax`), (15)
i.e. nmax is the value of n where Pfail dives below the
acceptable failure rate γ. From (15) we isolate nmax,
nmultimax (M,k, k0, `, γ, Lsuff , t)
=
ln[ε∗/InvBinoTail(`, d`k0k e, γ)]
−` ln(1− 1N−t )
=
ln(1−√Lsuff/t)− ln InvBinoTail(`, d`k0k e, γ)
−` ln(1− 1N−t )
. (16)
(Here N = M/w.) Expanding the logarithm in the denomi-
nator up to first order we get the approximation
nmultimax (M,k, k0, `, γ, Lsuff , t)
≈ N − t
`
ln
1−√Lsuff/t
InvBinoTail(`, d`k0k e, γ)
= (
M
k
− t
`
) ln
1−√Lsuff/t
InvBinoTail(`, d`k0k e, γ)
(17)
with relative error of order 1N−t . Comparing (17) to (8), we
see that the re-use of blob entries gives rise to a logarithmic
factor. Furthermore, the parameter t can be freely chosen in
the re-use case, while it is fixed in the single-use case.
3) Setting the parameters: Again we consider the parameters
M,k, k0, γ, Lsuff to be fixed. The task is to maximise nmultimax as
a function of the still free parameters ` and t. We observe (see
Fig. 5) that the best results are obtained with ` = 1. Note that
large values of ` can cause (16) to produce negative5 nmax,
especially when the coalition is large. The intuitive explanation
is that at large ` the colluders quickly learn many functional
indices; in contrast to the single-use case, this knowledge is
helpful for them since it allows them to build a pirated blob
5 Erring on the side of safety too much in Lemma 3.
with many functional entries. In the special case ` = 1 the
expression BinoTail(`, d`k0/ke, Pmiss) reduces to Pmiss, and
the result for nmax simplifies to
nmultimax (M,k, k0, ` = 1, γ, Lsuff , t)
=
ln(1−√Lsuff/t) + ln 1γ
− ln(1− 1M/k−t )
(18)
=
[M
k
− t−O(1)
]
ln
1−√Lsuff/t
γ
. (19)
Note that we have the constraint t > Lsuff/(1− γ)2.
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Fig. 6. nmultimax (18) as a function of t, at M = 2
24, k = 128, k0 = 96,
` = 1, γ = 0.1 for various coalition sizes c. The Lsuff is set according to
(1), with U/PFP = 230. .
V. OPTIMISATION FOR THE PAY-TV USE CASE
A consumer in a pay-TV system uses a decoder to access
content. To prevent unauthorized access to the content, it is
encrypted at the head-end system of the pay-TV provider
before it is distributed to the decoders, and only authorized
decoders are given access to the content decryption keys.
A pay-TV system adopts a broadcast model for distributing
the encrypted content and the associated key management
messages, sending the same encrypted content and messages
to all decoders. There is usually a limited amount of bandwidth
available for distributing key management messages since the
provider prefers to use as much as possible of the available
bandwidth for distributing content. For this reason, a pay-TV
security architecture typically contains keys that are shared
between a number of decoders. For detailed information and
a concrete example we refer to [17], [20], [24].
If a shared key is compromised from a decoder and re-
distributed, then the provider wants to trace the decoder
or decoders that have been compromised and revoke these
decoders to halt the piracy. Our scheme may be applied to
watermark a high-level node key (e.g. the root key) in a
revocation tree as used in [20], [24], so that publishing this key
becomes risky for pirates, even if they do a collusion attack on
the watermark. The corresponding blob can be pre-distributed
to each decoder during manufacturing.
Below we investigate the relation between the size of a blob
and the maximum number of colluders that can be traced
successfully. This number relates directly to the business case
8of the adversary. For example, if compromising the blob
from the read-proof and tamper-resistant security chip in the
decoder costs $50,000 per chip (i.e. per decoder) and if the
scheme is resistant against 8 colluders, then the costs of a
corresponding attack that cannot be corrected by the provider
“over-the-air” is at least $450,000.
For a concrete example, we use the values in Table I. The
number of blob uses assumes that the lifetime of a decoder is
7 years and that the key is updated every 30 minutes. Note that
a large value of PFP is allowed: the revocation of a decoder
based on a false positive can easily be reversed if necessary,
e.g. after receiving a service call from the corresponding
customer.
In Fig. 7 we compare the figure of merit nmax for the single-
use and multi-use case using the numbers from Table I.
• We observe a crossover. For small coalitions the multi-
use scheme performs better than the single-use scheme,
whereas this is reversed for large coalitions. The crossover
is understood as follows. On the one hand, re-using blob
entries has the advantage that it allows, in principle, for a
large n. On the other hand, re-use has the drawback that
the attackers learn entries that they can incorporate into the
pirated blob without fear of being traced. With increasing
coalition size the drawback becomes more pronounced,
since the ratio of functional entries versus tracing entries
in the pirated blob increases. As we saw in Section III-C,
the nmax for the single-use scheme depends on c relatively
weakly.
• The achievable nmax is in line with the desired number of
uses in the pay-TV context (≈ 1.2 · 105).
TABLE I
Typical values for the parameters in pay-TV systems.
M Size of the blob, in bits. preferably ≤ 224
k Key size, in bits. 128
k0 Key size difficult to brute force. 96
n Number of blob uses. preferably
≥ 7 · 365 · 24 · 2 ≈ 217
U Number of users. 220
c0 Anticipated number of attackers. preferably ≥ 8
PFP False Positive probability. ≤ 2−10
Lsuff Length of binary Tardos code. ≥ 6.6 · 103
Table 1: Typical values for the parameters in pay-TV systems.
M Size of the blob, in its. preferably  224
k Key size, in bits. 128
k0 Key size su ciently di cult to brute force. 96
n Number of blob uses. preferably   7 · 365 · 24 · 2 ⇡ 217
U Number of users. 220
c0 Anticipated number of attackers. preferably   8
PFP False Positive probability.  2 10
Lsu↵ Length of binary Tardos code.   6.6 · 103
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Fig. 7. Comparison of nmax in the single-use and multi-use case. In the
multi-use case the parameter t is set to its optimal value.M = 224, k = 128,
k0 = 96, γ = 0.1. The Lsuff is set according to (1), with U/PFP 230.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have introduced and analysed two BKC schemes for
symmetric decryption and traceability in the whitebox attacker
model, focusing on pay-TV scenarios that involve keys shared
by multiple customers. Compared to WBC, this approach
has the advantage that incompressibility and traceability are
achieved in an information-theoretically secure way. It may
also be interesting to use our schemes instead of group
signatures, as a difficult-to-extricate group credential with
post-quantum security.
We have shown that blob schemes are feasible in the context
of pay-TV. The parameter values are consistent with typical
pay-TV requirements. For the single-use scheme with large `,
special care must be taken to keep the control messages small.
A blob scheme may be used as a way to watermark node keys
close to the root, so that publishing such keys becomes risky
for pirates, even if they do a collusion attack on the watermark.
Our schemes can be tweaked and adapted in various ways.
There is a large space from which the design parameters
M,k, k0, γ, c0 can be chosen. We also mention that the pa-
rameter t (the number of tracing positions) can be kept secret.
This would force the colluders to make worst-case assumptions
and hence discard a larger fraction ε than if they had known t.
Furthermore, it is possible to use asymmetric cryptography.
Consider a set of position-dependent moduli Ni = piqi, where
the factorisation is known only to the Operator. The Operator
broadcasts (i,Ni, a), where i is a pointer to blob entry bi
and a is a number. The user computes the decryption key
as abimodNi. Watermarking is achieved by handing out to
different users blob entries bi that differ by an integer multiple
of ϕ(Ni) = (pi − 1)(qi − 1). In this way it becomes possible
to watermark functional blob entries, i.e. all blob entries. We
leave such schemes as a topic for future work.
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